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MARCH 1960

VOLUME 73

NUMBER 5

I HARVARD LAW REVIEW
THE ROMERO CASE AND SOME PROBLEMS
OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION t
Philip B. Kurland *
In Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., the Supreme
Court last term decided a case which has important implications in
many different areas of federal jurisdiction. The author's discussion
involves a consideration of both the meaning of "arising under
the laws" in 28 U.S.C. § x331, and the various confusing uses which
the Court has made of the term "pendent jurisdiction."

W

HATEVER place the name Francisco Romero may come

to have in the world of philosophy 1 or bullfighting,2 in the
lawyer's domain it will, from now on, denote a case of major importance in the field of federal jurisdiction. 3 The law's Francisco
Romero, a Spanish seaman on a Spanish ship temporarily berthed
in New York harbor at Hoboken, New Jersey, was severely injured while engaged in his duties aboard the vessel as it was being
prepared to receive its cargo of wheat. The injury resulted, as such
injuries often do, in a lawsuit. Romero asserted that his injury
entitled him to compensation from one or more of four defendants:
(i) a Spanish corporation which owned the ship; (2) aNew York
corporation alleged to be operating, controlling, and managing the
ship; (3) a Delaware corporation which was the stevedoring cont I am indebted to my colleague Professor Brainerd Currie for his invaluable
assistance in the preparation of this article, with some of which he disagrees. See
Currie, The Silver Oar and All That, 27 U. CuI. L. REv. 1 (1959). For an excellent
analysis of some of the implications of the Rotnero case, see also The Supreme
Court, 1958 Term, 73 HARv. L. R v. 84, 138-46 ('959).
* Professor of Law, The Law School, The University of Chicago. A.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1942; LL.B., Harvard, 1944.
I See HRIs, FRANcIsco ROlIERO ON PROBLEMS OF PmosoPHY (1959).
'See Graves, Enter the Leaden Age of Bullfighting, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13,
1959, § 6 (Magazine), p. 28.
3
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
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tractor; and (4) another New York corporation, also a contractor,
engaged in the installation of boards to receive the cargo. Against
the first defendant Romero asserted claims under the Jones Act,4
for unseaworthiness, and for maintenance and cure.' Against the
second defendant he asserted all of these claims plus one based on
general maritime tort.' The third and fourth defendants were sued
only for maritime tort.
441 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958).

' " 'Seaworthy' and 'unseaworthy' are words which may be easily defined by
general language. The difficulty arises when it is sought to fit facts to definition
or apply definition to facts. An appreciation, therefore, of the history of these terms
and of their application to new requirements, helps serve to understand their
true significance. The basic thought is that the vessel shall be equipped to perform
the duty which she owes to the human beings aboard of her and the cargo which
she carries." Adams v. Bortz, 279 Fed. 521, 523 (2d Cir. 1922). See also Lester
v. United States, 234 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1956); Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness
and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 CoRNELL L.Q. 381 (i954); Benbow, Seaworthiness and Seamen, 9 MiAm L.Q. 418 (955).
On the question whether the
doctrine of seaworthiness implies absolute liability, see Mitchell v. Trawler Racer,
Inc., 265 F.2d 426, 429-33 (ist Cir. 1959).
' "The ancient duty of a vessel and her owner to provide maintenance and cure
for seamen injured or falling ill while in service was recognized and, to some extent,
defined by this Court in The Osceola, i89 U.S. i58, 175. See also Chelentis v.
Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372; Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 13o. The
duty, which arises from the contract of employment, Cortes v. Baltimore Insular
Line, 287 U.S. 367, 371, does not rest upon negligence or culpability on the part of
the owner or master, id.; The City of Alexandria, 17 Fed. 390 (D.C.); The Mars,
149 Fed. 729, 731 (C.C.A.); Sorenson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 243 Fed. 280 (D.C.),
aff'd 247 Fed. 294 (C.C.A.); Brown v. The Bradish Johnson, Fed. Cas. No. 1992,
I Woods 3oi (C.C.), nor is it restricted to those cases where the seaman's employment is the cause of the injury or illness. The Wensleydale, 41 Fed. 829 (D.C.) ;
The Bouker No. 2, 241 Fed. 831 (C.C.A.). It is not an award of compensation for
the disability suffered, The Wanderer, 2o Fed. 140, 143 (C.C.), although breach
of the duty may render the owner liable for the consequential damages suffered by
the seaman. Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, supra, 371. The maintenance exacted
is comparable to that to which the seaman is entitled while at sea, The Henry B.
Fiske, 141 Fed. i88, 192 (D.C.); The Mars, 145 Fed. 446, 447, (D.C.), aff'd 149
Fed. 729 (C.C.A.); The Bouker No. 2, supra, 836, and 'cure' is care, including
nursing and medical attention during such period as the duty continues. Whitney
v. Olsen, io8 Fed. 292, 297 (C.C.A.) and cases cited; Daugherty v. ThompsonLockhart Co., 211 Fed. 224, 227 (D.C.)." Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S.
525, 527-28 (1938). See also Comment, Admiralty Right to Maintenance and Cure,
38 ILL. L. Rxv. 193 (1943); Comment, Maintenance and Cure, 5o MICH. L. REv. 435
(1952); Currie, .ino, A Sailor, 53 THE BRIEF 157 ('957).
I "The admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts embraces two principal subjects - maritime contracts and maritime torts. The latter . . . are civil wrongs
committed on navigable waters. The place where torts are committed, and not
their nature, is decisive on the question of admiralty jurisdiction. The Belfast v.
Boon, 7 Wall. 624, 637 .... ." Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. v. City of New
York, 135 F.2d 443, 446 (2d Cir. 1943).
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When Romero filed his case, several aspects of the "jurisdictional" law were well settled. A claim under the Jones Act could
be filed in a federal district court either on the "law side" or in
admiralty.' If it was filed "at law" the plaintiff was entitled to a
jury.' The Jones Act claim could also be brought in a state
court,10 where a jury would be available. The other three claims
could be brought independently in admiralty,"- without a jury, or
"at law" with a jury in the state courts or, if diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction existed, in the federal courts.' 2 The questions
which had not been settled were (i) whether the three nonstatutory maritime claims were by themselves cognizable on the "law
side" of the federal courts; (2) whether they were cognizable on
the "law side" of the federal courts when joined with a Jones Act
claim; and (3) whether, if cognizable "at law" because of the
joinder, they were to be tried by a jury. By filing his lawsuit on
the "law side" of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Romero raised these issues. The circuits were in conflict on the questions. The First Circuit had answered the first question in the affirmative. 13 The Second and
Third Circuits had clearly said no to the first question.' 4 The
Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits had reached an unhappy
compromise on the second and third questions.' 5
All four defendants in the Romero case moved to dismiss for
8

0

Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
Id. at 391.

0

Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33 (1926); Panama R.R. v. Vasquez,

271

U.S. 557 (1926) (dictum).
1' 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1958); see London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. Industrial Acc.
Comm'n, 279 U.S. 109 (1929); Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52
(.914); The Osceola, 189 U.S. i58 (i9o3).
"'See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 88-89 (1946) ; Leon v. Galceran, 78 U.S. (ii Wall.) 185 (1870); Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Mach. Co.,
237 U.S. 303 (ig'5). See also Stevens, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and the Uniform
General Maritime Law, 64 HARv. L. REV. 246 (i95o).
"a Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834 (1st Cir. 1952) ; Jansson v. Swedish Am.
Line, 185 F.2d 222, 217-18 (ist Cir. i95o) (dictum).
"4 Paduano v. Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, 22r F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1955);
Jordine v. Walling, 185 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 195o).
15 Compare Lindquist v. Dilkes, 127 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1942), with Jordine v.
Walling, supra note 14. Compare Mullen v. Fitz Simons & Connell Dredge & Dock
Co., z72 F.2d 6oi (7th Cir. 1948), with Mullen v. Fitz Simons & Connell Dredge
& Dock Co., 191 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. i95i). See also Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1959); McAfoos v. Canadian Pac. S.S., Ltd., 243
F.2d 270, 274 (2d Cir. 1957); Troupe v. Chicago, D. & G. Bay Transit Co., 234
F.2d 253, 258 (2d Cir. 1956).
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want of "jurisdiction." The district court granted their motions.

6

The court of appeals affirmed the dismissals.'
The Supreme
Court of the United States divided sharply over the issues presented by the case. Five members of the Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, held that the Jones Act claims should not
have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction, although they did not
state claims on which relief could be granted.' Two members of
the minority agreed with this conclusion. 9 The Court also held
that the non-Jones Act claims could not be maintained independently on the "law side" of the federal courts absent diversity-ofcitizenship jurisdiction, but they could properly be joined there
with a Jones Act claim. All four dissenters disagreed with these
propositions. The Court also held that all but one of the claims
against the second defendant were properly dismissed on the
merits and that the claims resting on diversity jurisdiction were
properly before the district court although joined with the nondiversity claim under the Jones Act. On these last rulings, the
Court was unanimous.
It is not the purpose of this paper to provide a critique of the
Romero case; that has been ably done elsewhere.2 ° Rather, an attempt will be made to consider the relationship of the Romero case
to two more general problems in the area of federal jurisdiction:
the meaning of the phrase "laws . . . of the United States" in section 1331 of the Judicial Code,2 and the concept of "pendent jurisdiction." At the outset of this discussion, it is necessary to state, as
will later be shown,22 that the Court in Romero was not faced with
any real jurisdictional questions, although it and the other courts
recently dealing with the problems have deemed them "jurisdictional." There can be no doubt that the District Court of the
Southern District of New York had power to decide each of the
16

142

F. Supp. 57o (S.D.N.Y. 1956).

17 244 F.2d 409 (2d

Cir. 1957).

" Cf. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 575 (1953); Montana-Dakota Util.

Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246,
U.S. 678 (1946).
19 358 U.S. at 414.
20 See Currie, The Silver Oar and All That,

27

249

(I95I); Bell v. Hood,

327

U. CHi. L. R v. i (Ig59) ; The

Supreme Court, z958 Term, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84, 138-47 (I99).
21 "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $io,ooo, exclusive of interest
and costs, and arises under -the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States."
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958).
22 See Section II, pp. 833-50 infra. See also Currie, The Silver Oar and All
That, 27 U. CHL L. Rv. i (x9s9).

HeinOnline -- 73 Harv. L. Rev. 820 1959-1960

I960]

ROMERO AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION

claims asserted by Romero. The real issues were whether the
claims could be joined and by what procedure their trial should be
governed, issues which are not jurisdictional since they do not involve any question of the competence of the district court to entertain the litigation.
I.

THE MEANING OF SECTION

1331

Romero contended that he had a right to file his nonstatutory
maritime claims on the "law side" of the district court by reason
of section 1331 of the Judicial Code. The majority rejected this
proposition. The minority would have ruled in Romero's favor
on this point. But in dealing with the construction of section 133 1
solely in the context of maritime causes, the Court failed to take
note of the implications of the solutions to this problem which
radiate far beyond the limits of this case and of the admiralty
power. On the majority's thesis it did not have to consider these
issues. But the minority did, and Mr. Justice Black was thus guilty
of oversimplification when he said, "The real core of the jurisdictional controversy is whether a few more seamen can have their
suits for damages passed on by federal juries instead of judges." 23
For more than seamen's injury cases were involved even if the
problem were confined to the distribution of maritime cases between the jury and nonjury calendars of the federal courts: The
minority construction of section 1331 would afford the right of
jury trial to all cases now tried in admiralty with the exception of
libels in rem. 4 And the Justice was equally in error when he implied that the rationale for sustaining section 1331 jurisdiction
proffered by Mr. Justice Brennan in Romero was the same as that
afforded by Judge Magruder in Doucette v. Vincent.

The alternative solutions offered to this "jurisdictional" problem may be summarized in this way: (i) Judge Magruder took
the position that such nonstatutory maritime claims "arise under"
the Constitution and are therefore properly cognizable under section 1331; (2) the minority of the Supreme Court held that section
1331 jurisdiction attaches because the claims properly "arise under" federal decisional law; (3) the majority of the Court rejected
23
24

358 U.S. at 388.
In 1957, the federal courts docketed 2,786 cases in admiralty; in 1958, the

number was 3,149. [1958] DmEcToR or THE ADmImISTRATIVE OF17CE OF THE UNnTED

STATES CouRTs ANN. REP. 163 (1959).
25 194 F.2d 834 (ist Cir. 1952).
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the idea that these claims have a constitutional base; it avoided
the question whether nonstatutory claims can arise under federal
law by resorting to the history of the Judicial Code to demonstrate
that maritime causes of this nature were not included within section
1331 and its predecessor sections of the Judicial Code.26
A. The Doucette Rationale
There is an obvious advantage in choosing Judge Magruder's
position rather than that of Mr. Justice Brennan, since the
Doucette rationale would be confined to maritime claims. Despite
this attraction, however, it is clear that Doucette rests on too weak
a base. In Doucette the question of the "jurisdiction" of the district court to entertain nonstatutory maritime claims on the "law
side" was raised sua sponte by the court of appeals.2 ' The same
court had previously, in a "carefully considered" dictum in Jannson v. Swedish American Line,2" indicated that "jurisdiction" existed under section 1331 of "a civil action for damages . . . to

enforce a claim cognizable in admiralty .... 29 Judge Magruder's reasoning had been succinctly set out in Jannson. Doucette did little more than turn the dictum into a holding and make
even more explicit the reliance on the Constitution rather than "the
laws . . . of the United States" as the basis for section 1331

jurisdiction."

In Jannson, Magruder had written:

If the "Constitution itself adopted and established, as part of the
26 The opinion for the Court relied upon the interpretation of -the 1875 grant

of federal-question jurisdiction as the appropriate basis for finding the meaning
of § 1331 for the purposes of this case. "The modifications of language to be found
in the present version of this Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, were not intended to change
in any way the meaning or content of the Act of 1875. See Reviser's Note to 28
U.S.C. § 1331." 358 U.S. at 359 n.5. The pertinent language of the 1875 grant provided the federal trial courts with jurisdiction "of all suits of a civil nature at
common law or in equity . . . arising under the Constitution or laws of the United
States . . . " Act of March 3, 1875, § i, 18 Stat. 47o. The minority took no exception to the proposition that the x875 statute had been amended only by change
of language and not by change of meaning.
27 194 F.2d at 836. The problem is still regarded by the First Circuit as one
calling for court inquiry on its own motion. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 265
F.2d 426, 427-28 (ist Cir. i959).
28 i85 F.2d 212, 217-18 (1st Cir. 195o). See also Nolan v. General Seafoods
Corp., 112 F.2d 515, 517 (Ist Cir. 1940).
29 I85 F.2d at 217.
30 Magruder's reliance on the Constitution rather than the laws of the United
States as the basis for jurisdiction in Doucette is constantly reiterated in the opinion. See The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HAgv. L. Rlv. 84, 139 (3959). But see
Currie, The Silver Oar and All That, 27 U. Cm3r. L. Rlv. i, 59 n.327 (a959).
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laws of the United States, approved rules of the general maritime
law," and if, when a cause of action cognizable in admiralty is sued
on at common law, either in a state court or on the law side of a federal district court, the court must apply the general maritime law
rather than the law of the state of the forum, and if the judgment of
a state court in such a case is reviewable by the United States Supreme Court because a federal question is necessarily involved,
then it would plainly follow, we think, that a civil action for damages filed on the law side of a federal district court, to enforce a
claim cognizable in admiralty, may be maintained in the district
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 as a case arising "under the
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States" - assuming,
of course, that the requisite jurisdictional amount is present . . .31
It is thus obvious that, although the rationalization thus offered
would be applicable to all admiralty cases governed by national
law and not merely to seamen's personal-injury actions, it would
be limited in its application to admiralty cases.
The fallacy of this approach lies in its erroneous major premise
that "the Constitution prescribed the substantive law to be applied
in such cases." 32 The support for this proposition derives from
the language of the Supreme Court in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
Stewart,3 3 which Judge Magruder quoted in both of his opinions.
Taken in context, however, the language of that Supreme Court
opinion says no more than that : (i) The admiralty law was received by the United States at the time of the adoption of the Constitution much as the common law of England was received by the
states, often by way of constitutional provision; (2) the national
government is supreme over the states with regard to the admiralty
power under article III as it is supreme over the states with regard to the powers specified in article I. To say this is hardly
to raise the judicial opinions and statutes formulated under the
admiralty power to the level of constitutional provisions. They
would be strange constitutional provisions which were subject to
change both by the legislature and the judiciary. Certainly in the
event of conflict between admiralty legislation or decisions and
provisions of the Constitution, there could be no doubt that the
latter must prevail. The common law received by the states in like
manner does not have constitutional status in those jurisdictions.
31

185 F.2d at

Co. v. Stewart,

217-i8.

The internal quotation is from Knickerbocker Ice

253 U.S. 149, 160 (1920).

32 194 F.2d at 84X.

33 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
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Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in the Knickerbocker Ice case,
said: "I do not suppose that anyone would say that [the Admiralty clause] . . .by implication, enacted a whole code for master

and servant at sea, that could be modified only by a constitutional
amendment." 11 How much stranger it would have appeared to
him if the majority opinion in that case had ruled that such a code,
amendable by Congress and the national courts, was the equivalent of Constitutional mandate. Judge Magruder's major premise,
however ingenious, will not stand analysis. And with the collapse
of this foundation, the entire edifice which would allow seamen to
maintain their actions for maritime-tort claims on the "law side"
must fall. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it for the Court in
Romero: 35 "Of course all cases to which 'judicial power' extends
'arise,' in a comprehensive, non-jurisdictional sense of the term,
'under this Constitution.' It is the Constitution that is the ultimate source of all 'judicial Power'- defines grants and implies
limits - and so 'all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction'
arise under the Constitution in the sense that they have constitutional sanction. But they are not 'Cases . . .arising under this

Constitution . .

.

.

"

6

B. The Brennan Interpretationof Section 133z
Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion in Romero uses a less esoteric
approach but one which has greater implications for nonmaritime
law. For the minority of the Supreme Court, the plain meaning of
section 1331 requires acceptance of jurisdiction over nonstatutory
maritime claims. In substance the argument depends upon four
points: (i) Section i331 extends the jurisdiction of the United

States district courts to all civil cases in law and equity arising
under the laws of the United States; (2) the word "laws" in the
34 253 U.S. at 167.

35 358 U.S. at 368.
11 Magruder's third point raises an interesting problem which the Court has not
adequately considered. Review of state-court judgments on certiorari is authorized
"where any title, right, or privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under
the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commission held or authority exercised
under, the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1958). (Emphasis added.) The
admiralty cases coming to the Supreme Court on certiorari are often based on nonstatutory claims. See, e.g., Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
Nothing in § 1257(3), says judge Magruder, would seem to authorize such review
unless it be the word "Constitution" since the word "statute"- not "laws"- can
hardly be defined to mean judicial decisions. It is more likely that the Court's attention was not called to this defect in its certiorari jurisdiction- or that the Court
chose to ignore it-than that it was sustaining jurisdiction on the ground that the
cases were constitutional ones.
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statute includes laws created by federal judicial decisions as well
as by congressional legislation; (3) the nonstatutory claims asserted in Romero were based on rights established by decisions of
the national courts; (4)nondiversity maritime claims, except insofar as the remedy sought is one peculiar to admiralty, are civil
cases in law and equity. All four of these propositions are essential to the minority position.
The first proposition is beyond dispute. The third could be rejected only by overruling a long line of Supreme Court decisions,
beginning with Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen37 and "culminating"
in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn.5 The majority of the Court rejected the fourth proposition and, therefore, did not have to consider the second with its interesting radiations beyond the maritime
jurisdiction. In brief, the majority rested on the proposition that
the statute which first granted general federal-question jurisdiction to the federal trial courts did not include within the term
"suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity . . . arising
under the . . . laws of the United States" 11 maritime claims
not resting on a federal statute. In large measure this understanding of the meaning given to the 1875 statute by its framers
was predicated on Justice Marshall's dictum in American Ins. Co.
v. Canter 40 that cases in admiralty were a different species from
cases at law or equity. Further support was garnered from the
37 244 U.S. 205 (1917).

38 346 U.S. 406 (1:953).

11 See note 26 supra.
40 26 U.S. (i Pet.) 511, 545-46 (1828):
The Constitution and laws of the United States, give jurisdiction to the District Courts over all cases in admiralty; but jurisdiction over the case, does
not constitute the case itself. We are therefore to inquire, whether cases in admiralty, and cases arising under the laws and Constitution of the United States,
are identical.
If we have recourse to that pure fountain from which all the jurisdiction
of the Federal Courts is derived, we find language employed which cannot well
be misunderstood. The Constitution declares, that "the judicial power shall
extend to all cases in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws
of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, or other public ministers, and
consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."
The Constitution certainly contemplates these as three distinct classes of
cases; and if they are distinct, the grant of jurisdiction over one of them,
does not confer jurisdiction over either of the other two. The discrimination
made between them, in the Constitution, is, we think, conclusive against their
identity. If it were not so, if this were a point open to inquiry, it would be
difficult to maintain the proposition that they are the same. A case in admiralty
does not, in fact, arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States.
These cases are as old as navigation itself; and the law, admiralty and maritime, as it has existed for ages, is applied by our Courts to the cases as they
arise.
The conflict between the majority and -the minority in Romero extended even to
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fact that for three-quarters of a century after the enactment of the
predecessor of section 133 no court had ever held that the federalquestion jurisdiction could be extended to include nonstatutory
maritime causes. Moreover, Mr. Justice Clifford, in an opinion
rendered in 1876, only one year after the grant of the federalquestion jurisdiction to the federal courts, had said: "Parties in
maritime cases are not . . . compelled to proceed in the admiral-

ty at all, as they may resort to their common-law remedy in the
State courts, or in the Circuit Court, if the party seeking redress
and the other party are citizens of different States." 41
Mr. Justice Brennan was unimpressed by the failure of litigants
and legal writers to invoke the federal-question jurisdiction in
maritime cases decided prior to Doucette. He read American Ins.
Co. v. Canter only as a rejection of the Magruder position that
maritime cases arise under the Constitution: "In its broadest permissible interpretation, the dictum only means that the fact that
the Constitution creates admiralty jurisdiction does not make all
admiralty cases cases arising under the Constitution." 42 He rejected the Clifford statement on the ground that it was a dictum
"in a case decided shortly after the Act's passage, where the effect
of the new statute was not at all presented or discussed." " His
most telling point with reference to the alleged categorical difference between maritime causes and cases in law and equity was
stated this way: "In fact, the grant of diversity jurisdiction in the
1875 Act was in the very same terms as the grant of the 'arising
under' jurisdiction; the same introductory phrase, 'suits of a civil
nature at common law or in equity,' governed both grants. It
seems to me very odd to say that this phrase, introducing two
grants of jurisdiction, had the effect of excluding maritime causes
of action entirely from the one but not at all from the other." "
The fact is that the acceptance of the diversity jurisdiction over
maritime claims under the saving-clause developed long before
establishment of the Jensen line of cases, when federal courts may
have been under the happy delusion that they were applying rules
of general common law not derived from admiralty sources.
the appropriate citation of the Marshall language in the Canter case. Compare 358
U.S. at 364 with 358 U.S. at 399 n.g. On this score, the minority would seem to
have the better of the argument.
41 Norton v. Switzer, 93 U.S. 355, 356 (1876), quoted in 358 U.S. at 370.
42 358 U.S. at 402.
43

1d. at 406.
Id. at 398; see The Supreme Court, z958 Term, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84, 140
(1959).
44

HeinOnline -- 73 Harv. L. Rev. 826 1959-1960

i96o]

ROMERO AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION

Clearly there is a doctrinal inconsistency in treating saving-clause
cases brought in diversity suits as cases in law or equity, but when
brought in the national courts on the basis of their federal origin
as cases in admiralty and not in law or equity, when both categories are governed by substantive rules made pursuant to the
admiralty power.
Assessment of the opinions suggests that the majority has effectuated the legislative purpose as it was expressed in 1875 and
presumably remains unchanged. The minority has, on the other
hand, proved that the language of the statute is capable of a construction which would include nonstatutory maritime causes
within section 1331 and has asserted that there are factors weighing in favor of that interpretation. It is not surprising that in the
twilight area between the dominion clearly assigned to the legislature and that clearly assigned to the judiciary, the champions of
broad judicial power were willing to read their own desires into
the statute in order to achieve a result more in keeping with their
rewriting of the FELA.4 5 But even if the minority had been successful in persuading the Court as to the validity of its fourth
proposition - that there was no basic difference contemplated between cases in admiralty on the one hand and cases in law and
equity on the other - it would still have to establish its argument
that the word "laws" as used in section 1331 includes judicially
created rights as well as rights created by statute. And it is the
fact that four Justices of the Court were ready so to read the statute, while the others remained silent on this point, that gives the
Romero case a really broad potential.
C. The Meaning of Section

1331

for Nonmaritime Cases

"There is no federal general common law," said Mr. Justice
Brandeis in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.46 Despite the breadth of that
statement, the fact remains that there are many areas of the law
in which the federal courts are called upon to formulate applicable
rules of law without guidance from legislation. Mr. Justice
Brandeis himself recognized this in an opinion which he delivered
on the same day as Erie, in which he applied "federal common
law" to a case involving the construction of an interstate com45

The FELA is incorporated by reference in the Jones Act. See G

oRF &

BLAcK, ADmALTY §§ 6-26 to -37 (i957). For the rewriting of the FELA, see, e.g.,
Ringhiser v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 354 U.S. 901 (1957); Reed v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 351 U.S. 502 (1956).
46 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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pact.4 r And the Court has elsewhere recognized that "federal
common law" still plays an important part in the formulation of
national legal doctrine. Thus in the Lincoln Mills case the Court
said: "It is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal
law where federal rights are concerned." 48 Nor is this power
limited to situations in which Congress has purportedly given the
courts a blank check, creating jurisdiction and leaving the substantive rules to be made by the national judiciary, as under section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act as interpreted in Lincoln
Mills.49 Where the United States is a party to litigation involving
liability on Government commercial paper, "in the absence of
an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion
the governing rule of law according to their own standards." 'o
In diversity litigation, when the plaintiff sought to recover damages for defamation against Government employees, the Court
recently ruled "that the validity of petitioner's claim of absolute
privilege must be judged by federal standards, to be formulated by
the courts in the absence of legislative action by Congress." 51
Federal common law is similarly fashioned in cases in which the
United States is a party, 52 in bankruptcy cases,

3

in patent cases,5 4

in cases originating in the District of Columbia,55 and even in
some cases coming to the Supreme Court from state courts when
federal interests are involved.56 This list is not exhaustive. 57
17 Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110
(,938).
48
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (I957).
49
See 61 Stat. i56 (i947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958); Meltzer, The Supreme
Court, Congress, and State Jurisdictionover Labor Relations: 11, 59 CoLurm. L. Rv.
269 (1959) ; Bickel and Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process:
The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HAnv. L. REv. 1 (1957).
10 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943); see National
Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454 (1945).
"1Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 597 (1959); see Kaufman v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 224 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1955); O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., "E3
F.2d 539 (ist Cir. x94o) ; cf. Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445 (1948).
52 See cases cited note 5o supra; United States v. Fullaxd-Leo, 331 U.S. 256
(1947) ; Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947Y. Similar powers
have been exerted where one of the parties was a national corporation. D'Oench,
Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942).

"See

Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726 (1946); Phelan v. Middle States Oil

Corp., 22o F.2d 593, 617 (2d Cir. 1955).
54 See Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942).

"1 See Barr v. Matteo, 36o U.S. 564 (1959).
'6 See Farmers Educ. & Co-op. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959);
Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 289 (1958).
"7 See Note, Exceptions to Erie v. Tompkins: The Survival of Federal Common
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Even when the Court has refused to sanction the use of federal
common law, and has applied state law rs or has refused to give
sanction to a newly claimed right, it has not denied the existence
of its power to create federal law. Thus, in United States v. Standard Oil Co.,"D after declining to recognize a claim in favor of the
United States against a corporation which had injured one of its
soldiers, the Court said:
[A]lthough federal judicial power to deal with common-law problems was cut down in the realm of liability or its absence governable by state law, that power remained unimpaired for dealing
independently, whegever necessary or appropriate, with essentially
federal matters, even though Congress has not acted affirmatively
about the specific question.
In this sense, therefore, there remains what may be termed, for
want of a better label, an area of "federal common law" or perhaps
more accurately "law of independent federal judicial decision,"
outside the constitutional realm, untouched by the Erie decision.60
Certainly the decisions make it difficult to ascertain when the federal courts will resort to their power of "independent federal judicial decision."01 But this might equally be said of the difficulty
of ascertaining the rationale of the existence of a federal question. 2 Suffice it for our purposes to note that such judicially created rights exist - and not merely as defenses to claims arising
under state law or national statute. 3 The question then is whether
a claim based on such federally created rights would "arise under"
Law, 59 HAuv. L. REv. 966 (1946); Note, Clearfield: Clouded Field of Federal

Common Law, 53 CoL m. L. REv. 991 (I953); Comment, Erie Limited: The Confines of State Law in the Federal Courts, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 561 (1955).
58 See Commissioner v. Stem, 357 U.S. 39, 45 (1958); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust
& SaV. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956); DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570
(1956).
59332 U.S. 301 (x947).
6

oId. at 307-08.
61 For an excellent analysis, see Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law":

Competence and Discretionin the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision,
iog U. PA. L. REv. 797 (,957).
62 See Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLEM . L.
REV. 157 (1953).
6 See, e.g., Kaufman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 224 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1955).
Even if the rights so created were defensive in nature, it is not yet clear whether
they would be the measure of claims under the Declaratory Judgment Act. See
Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (i95o); Developments in the
Law- Declaratory Judgments- 194x-z949, 62 HARv. L. REv. 787, 802-03 (1949);
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the "laws" of the United States within the meaning of section
1331. To this question the courts have not yet provided an answer, except that four Justices of the Supreme Court, the dissenters
in Romero, apparently would sustain such jurisdiction.
Perhaps the factor weighing most heavily against the assumption of such jurisdiction is the same dearth of authority which the
majority found so persuasive in Romero.6" However, some of our
foremost commentators in the field of federal jurisdiction have
suggested the existence of such jurisdiction. Thus, Professors
Hart and Wechsler have said: "A decision that a given matter is
governed by federal law . . .may or may not have the conse-

quence of establishing a basis for federal question jurisdiction." "
Professor Mishkin is less reserved in the expression of his opinion:
The first formulation of the requirement developed by the courts
is that the plaintiff must be contending that a federally ordained
rule specifically creates his cause of action. Any national source will
suffice, whether Constitution, treaty, or law. Indeed, he need not
maintain even that some piece of national legislation provides, in so
many words, the governing rule of substance; if it is his position
that his right to relief is granted by federal common law, whether
in connection with a statute or otherwise, jurisdiction in the national trial courts will be supported. 66
Unfortunately, the authorities cited in support of the "or otherwise" proposition, Bell v. Hood 67 and Doucette, involved cases
purportedly arising under the Constitution rather than the laws
of the United States. Like the commentators, the courts have occasionally been bemused by the question outside of the admiralty
Note, Federal Question Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Declaratory Judgment
Act, 4 VAND. L. REv. 827 ('95').
64

The Fifth Circuit has found such jurisdiction to exist in a federal enclave
case. Mater v. Holley, 200 F.2d 123 (Sth Cir. 1952), cited by Mr. justice Brennan,
358 U.S. at 393; see Coffman v. Cleveland Wrecking Co., 24 F. Supp. 581
(W.D. Mo. 1938); Note, Federal Areas: The Confusion of a Jurisdictional-Geographical Dichotomy, 1o0 U. PA. L. REv. 124 (1952); Comment, Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction Over State-Ceded Land, 4 ST. Louis U.LJ. 334 (1957).
6 HART & WECHSLER,

THE FEDERAL COURTS AND TiE FEDERAL SYSTEM

699

(1953).

66 Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 CoLum. L. REv.
157, 165 (i953). (Emphasis added.)
67327

U.S. 678 (1946).
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area, but have generally found it unnecessary to rest jurisdiction
8
on this ground.
Next to the want of favorable authority as an argument against
such jurisdiction is the proposition that the courts have read the
word "laws" to mean "statutes" when they have referred to section 1331. There is indeed ample evidence that this has been
done, 9 but never, except in admiralty cases7 0 has it been done
when the court was attempting to distinguish between statutes
and decisional law.
The final argument to be made against the jurisdiction of the
federal courts over this kind of claim is the general one that federal jurisdiction is to be construed restrictively, with all doubts
resolved against jurisdiction.7 1 There would, of course, be few
such cases added to the business of the federal court on the basis
of existing law, by reason of this application of the Code. But
open acknowledgment of the existence of this jurisdiction would
be likely to stimulate the effort toward "creative development by
the judicial process." 72
The reason for sustaining this jurisdiction, however, at least in
nonmaritime areas, would seem to outweigh the arguments against
it. The primary contention in favor of jurisdiction is based on
the rationale of the 1875 grant, which swayed the Court to deny
jurisdiction in Romero. When the general federal-question jurisdiction was created, federal-court jurisdiction over admiralty matters already existed. But the reason for creating federal-question
jurisdiction in the federal courts, "to insure the availability of a
forum designed to minimize the danger of hostility toward, and
73
specially suited to the vindication of, federally created rights,
is as applicable to judicially created rights as to rights created by
statute. And, indeed, the majority in Romero seemed to acknowledge that the test of federal-question jurisdiction lies in the source
6 See, e.g., Kaufman v. Western Union Tel. CO.,

224

F.2d

723, 725

(5th Cir.

1955).

69 See, e.g., Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912); Railroad Co. v.
Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135, 141 (i88o) ; Tennessee v. Davis, ioo U.S. 257, 264 (1879),
all cited in Jordine v. Walling, 185 F.2d 662, 667 (3d Cir. i95o).
70 See, e.g., Jordine v. Walling, I85 F.2d 662, 667 (3d Cir. i95o).
71 See Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (I934).
72 The phrase is from HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 65, at 708.
71 Paduano v. Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, 221 F.2d 61g, 618 (2d Cir.
1955), quoted at 358 U.S. 395. The court of appeals' opinion relied for this proposition on Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13
LAw & CONTENT. PROB. 216, 223-34 (1948).
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rather than the form of law: "[T] his jurisdictional decision would
largely depend on whether the governing law is state or federal." "
If it be true that the Court has not yet held that jurisdiction
under section 1331 may be based on judicially created rights, it is
equally true that the Court has marched right up to this point.
For in cases in which the Court has been unable to find explicit
warrant in congressional legislation, it has not hesitated to find
that a statute implicitly creates a basis for asserting section 1331
jurisdiction. For example, in Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen75 Mr. Chief Justice Stone, whose dictum in Healy
v. Ratta 76 on the necessity for confining the jurisdiction of federal
courts is so frequently cited, said on behalf of the Court:
We also hold that the right asserted by petitioner which is
derived from the duty imposed by the Railway Labor Act on the
Brotherhood, as bargaining representative, is a federal right implied from the statute and the policy which it has adopted. It is
the federal statute which condemns as unlawful the Brotherhood's conduct. "The extent and nature of the legal consequences
of this condemnation, though left by the statute to judicial determination, are nevertheless to be derived from it and the federal
policy which it has adopted." Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190,
200-201; Board of County Commissioners v. United States, 308
U.S. 343; Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176-7;
cf. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363. The case is
therefore one arising under a law regulating commerce of which the
federal courts are given jurisdiction by 28 U.S.C. [§ 1337]
77

The constant emphasis on "federal policy" and the reference to the
Clearfield case 71 suggest how close to the edge of the immediate
problem the Court has come.
The technical arguments in favor of jurisdiction, in themselves
hardly persuasive, are useful in demonstrating the absence of
congressional policy different from that described in the quotation
from Paduano above. 9 Mr. Justice Brennan used the Erie case
to show that the word "laws" should be construed to mean judiU.S. at 375.
75 323 U.S. 210 (i944). See also Jacobson v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 206
F.2d 153, 157 (1st Cir. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 909 (1954); Fielding v. Allen, x8i
F.2d 163 (2d Cir. I950).
76292 U.S. at 270.
74 358

77 323
78

U.S.

at 213.

See p. 828 & note 5o supra.

79 See text accompanying note 73 supra.
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cial decisions as well as statutes.8 0 Commentators had previously
pointed out the inaptness of that authority for that purpose.8' But
if Erie cannot be used to prove the affirmative of this proposition,
it is at least useful to show that the word "laws" need not mean
only statutes. And this proposition is buttressed by the fact that
Congress has, in the portion of the Judicial Code dealing with district-court jurisdiction, used the phrase "Act of Congress" where
it was clearly referring only to statutory law.82
It would seem, therefore, that when a claim is properly asserted
as depending on federal rights created by national courts, the case
may well be considered to be one arising under the laws of the
United States as specified in section 1331. The Romero dissent
has moved the Supreme Court closer to that conclusion. The
majority position does not read against it. It should be carefully
noted, however, that the anticipated rule would apply only when
the source of the substantive rule is national authority. The mere
fact that the law has been stated by a federal court is not sufficient. Chief Justice Waite established this proposition fifty years
before Erie.83 There is neither authority nor reason for departing
from it.
II.

PENDENT JURISDICTION

After denying that section 1331 afforded the nonstatutory claims
independent entry to the "law side" of the federal courts, Mr.
so358 U.S. at 393. See Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 526-27 (1951):
"The term law in our jurisprudence usually includes the rules of court decisions as
well as legislative acts.... No reason is apparent why a more restricted meaning
should be given 'national laws or regulations.'"
81
Thus, Judge Wyzanski, in Jenkins v. Roderick, E56 F. Supp. 299, 301-02
n.3 (D. Mass. 1957), had this to say: "It may be contended that only acts of Con-

gress and not mere decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are 'laws'
of the United States. A disingenuous answer is that there are in other fields rulings
that the word 'laws' does include court decisions. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins . . .
Warren v. United States ... ." And a law-review note, which bears a marked
similarity to the views expressed by the minority of the Court in Romero, recog-

nized the weakness of the Erie argument. See Note, The Expansion of Federal
Question Jurisdictionto Maritime Claims: A New JurisdictionalTheory, 66 HARv.
L. REV. 315, 324 n.86 (1952).
2See 28 U.S.C. §§ I336-4o, 1343(3), (4), 1345, 1346(2), X349, X353, 1355

(1958) ; cf. note 36 supra.
13 "[A] case does not arise under the laws of the United States simply because
this court, or any other Federal court, has decided in another suit the questions of
law which are involved." Leather Mfrs. Bank v. Cooper, 120 U.S. 778, 781 (1887) ;
cf. Giles v. Little, 134 U.S. 645, 648-49 (189o) ; Provident Say. Life Assur. Soc'y
v. Ford, 114 U.S. 635, 641-42 (I885).
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Justice Frankfurter decided that the Court could still reach the
substantive issue of the validity of these claims, since they were
properly before the district court by reason of the fact that they
were appended to the Jones Act claim. The lengthy treatment
afforded the section 133i problem proved unnecessary in dealing
with this question of "pendent jurisdiction":
[T]he District Court may have jurisdiction of them "pendent"
to its jurisdiction under the Jones Act. Of course the considerations
which call for the exercise of pendent jurisdiction of a state claim
related to a pending federal cause of action within the appropriate
scope of the doctrine of Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 [I933], are
not the same when, as here, what is involved are related claims
based on the federal maritime law. We perceive no barrier to the exercise of "pendent jurisdiction" in the very limited circumstances
before us. Here we merely decide that a district judge has jurisdiction to determine whether a cause of action has been stated if that
jurisdiction has been invoked by a complaint at law rather than by
a libel in admiralty, as long as the complaint also properly alleges
a claim under the Jones Act.84

Despite this careful language, it is unfortunate that the Supreme
Court followed the lead of the lower federal courts in pinning the
label "pendent jurisdiction" on the problem before it. That phrase
has already come into common use to cover disparate situations,
with much resulting confusion. It will not prove helpful to bring
another under that umbrella-like phrase. For if in this stage of
our jurisprudential development it is no longer necessary to assert
that the same words may have different meanings in different contexts,8 the fact remains that there is still a tendency on the part
of the bench and the bar to ignore the obvious and to carry over
the meaning given to a phrase in one situation to solve problems
which are entirely distinct.
There are four separate and distinct situations which may now
be hiding under the rubric of "pendent jurisdiction." The first is
the so-called Siler doctrine,8 6 that in cases presenting both constitutional questions and questions of state law the federal courts
may decide the issues of state law. It is based on the need to
84 358 U.S. at 38o-8i.
5

s See, e.g., Coox, TnE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OP THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
ch. VI (1942)"; Morgan, Rules of Evidence-Substantive or Procedural?, zo
V~ze. L. REV. 467, 470 (1957).
86 Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (Igog). This doctrine is qualified
by -the "abstention" technique of Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496
(I941). See generally Note, 59 CoLuins. L. REv. 749 (1959).
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avoid the resolution of constitutional questions until they must be
faced in order to reach a judgment in a lawsuit.8 7 It is thought
that this doctrine of avoidance justifies the incursion of the federal courts into the domain of state courts, perhaps on the theory
that it is less likely to damage the principles of federalism than
would a premature declaration of the invalidity of a state law.
The second is the so-called doctrine of Hurn v. Oursler,8 which
authorizes the decision by a federal court of a state claim, over
which it would have no independent ground for jurisdiction, because the identity of issues between the federal and state claims
is such that the basis for deciding the former will also provide a
basis for deciding the latter.89 The argument for this extension of
jurisdiction is put in terms of convenience and the avoidance of
trying the same case twice. Certainly the Hurn v. Oursler doctrine provides a less pressing reason for federal invasion of state
court jurisdiction than does Siler. But both the Siler and the Hum
v. Oursler situations involve the federal courts in the assumption
of jurisdiction which would not ordinarily be theirs. The third
and fourth categories do not really involve jurisdictional questions, for here each of the claims has independent access to the
federal courts. In the third, labelled Oklahoma for reasons which
will appear, one question is a constitutional one as in Siler, but
the other is a question of federal, not state, law. Clearly here the
second claim ought to be decided not only when to do so would
avoid the constitutional question, but simply because, under ordinary circumstances, the question presented is one which independently calls for federal-court adjudication. The only countervailing factors are the ordinarily existing objections to joinder:
prejudice or complexity or imposition on judicial facilities. In
short, all the reasons for joinder in Siler are present without the
shortcoming of assuming state-court jurisdiction. In the fourth
category we find the Romero case. Here there is no constitutional
claim, but both claims are properly and independently within the
ken of the federal courts. Under ordinary circumstances there
would be no question that both could be decided in the same lawsuit. If the Siler compulsion for joinder is absent, the case never87

See Brandeis, J., concurring in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 354-56

(X936).

U.S. 238 (1933).
See Shulman & Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal Pro-

8s 289
89

cedure, 45 YALE L.J. 393 (1936); Note, Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in
Multiple Question Cases, i U. CH . L. REV. 480 (1934).
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theless remains a far stronger one than Hurn v. Oursler.0 The
third and fourth categories raise questions only when the claims
would ordinarily be heard by the federal court sitting in different capacities. But clearly, as will appear, these are not jurisdictional questions in the ordinary sense in which that word is used.
And the "pendent jurisdiction" shibboleth should not be applied
to them.
The different results required in the Romero case from that in
Hum v. Oursler are demonstrated by the action of the majority
in the Romero case itself. There the Supreme Court authorized
the resolution of the non-Jones Act claims - at least to the extent
of passing on the sufficiency of the complaint - although the
Jones Act claim which required trial by the federal court sitting
as a court of law was dismissed without trial. Neither the Siler
nor the Hum v. Oursler rationale 91 would justify the decision on
the state claims by the federal court under these circumstances,
for there would be no need to decide the state questions, either to
avoid a constitutional issue or to avoid multiple trials of the same
issues. This is not to suggest that the courts have consistently
followed this distinction,92 but rather to point out that the ruling
in Romero should not be read as approval of such action in the
first two as distinguished from the third and fourth categories set
out above. Again, the close identity of issues need not be required
in the Romero-type case to the extent that Hum v. Oursler demands, since again -thereneed be no fear of treading on state jurisdiction. Too rigid adherence to the Hum v. Oursler principle in
Romero-type situations has already misled some federal courts
into reaching results different from that apparently sanctioned by
93

Romero.

90 See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 265 F.2d 426, 4-28 (ist Cir. 1959).

, See 289 U.S. at 245-46, 247-48.
As to Siler, see United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 278 U.S. 300

02

(.929);

Risty v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 270 U.S. 378 (1926); Fitzhenry v. Erie R.R.,
7 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). As to Hum v. Oursler, see Telechron, Inc. v.
Parissi, 197 F.2d 757, 762 (2d Cir. '.952) ; Georgia v. Wenger, aI87 F.2d 285, 287-88
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 822 (i95i); Kleinman v. Betty Dain Creations,
Inc., i8 F.2d 546, 548 (2d Cir. i95i); Massachusetts Universalist Convention v.
Hildreth & Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497, 5oi (1st Cir. i95o); Strachman v. Palmer,
177 F.2d 427, 433 (ist Cir. 1949) (concurring opinion). See also Schlesinger &
Strasburger, Divestment of Federal Jurisdiction: A Trapdoor Section in the Judicial Code, 39 CoLuM. L. REV. 595 (1939).
93See Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1959),
excluding consideration of the maintenance-and-cure claims for lack of identity of
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In Romero the real problem was not one of "pendent jurisdiction" but rather of the propriety and effect of joining two or more
federal claims which would ordinarily be triable before the federal
court sitting in different capacities and, perhaps, by different methods of trial. The Supreme Court in Romero provided a rationale
for the joinder of the maritime claims with the Jones Act claim
on the "law side" of the district court. Presumably it limited
that right of joinder to claims involving the same parties,9 4 since
it sustained the jurisdiction over the claims against the other
parties on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. 95 And it clearly refused to state what the appropriate procedure for the trial of the
non-Jones Act claims should be, either when the Jones Act claim
is tried or when it is dismissed before trial: "We are not called
upon to decide whether the District Court may submit to the jury
the 'pendent' claims under the general maritime law in the event
that a cause of action be found to exist." 96
Professor Currie has examined the cases involving joinder of
Jones Act claims with the claims of a nonstatutory maritime
nature.9 7 He has reached the conclusions (i) that joinder of the
claims involving the same parties is proper and (2) that the joinder
implies that the right to a jury trial which is afforded to Jones
Act claimants must also be available with regard to the other
maritime claims, at least when the former goes to trial. He has
shown, too, that until Judge Wyzanski aroused sleeping dogs in
I947,"' the lower federal courts generally followed the procedure
of joinder with jury trial for all claims. 9
It is proposed here to examine two situations analogous to
Romero outside the admiralty field to see (i) whether the courts
treat the problem as a jurisdictional question, (2) whether joinder
of claims ordinarily required to be filed before the court sitting in
issues with the Jones Act claim; Mullen v. Fitz Simons & Connell Dredge & Dock
Co., 19 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 888 (1951); Jordine v. Walling,
185 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 195o).
94
This accords with the conclusion reached by the courts of appeals under
Hum v. Oursler. See Benbow v. Wolf, 217 F.2d 203 ( 9 th Cir. 1954); Gladden v.
Stockard S.S. Co., 184 F.2d 5io (3d Cir. i95o); New Orleans Pub. Belt R.R. v.
Wallace, i73 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1949); Pearce v. Pennsylvania R.R., 162 F.2d
524 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 765 (i947).
95 358 U.S. at 381.
96 Ibid.
17 Currie, The Silver Oar and All That, 27 U. Cri. L. REv. I, 41-58 (1959).
" See McDonald v. Cape Cod Trawling Corp., 71 F. Supp. 888 (D. Mass. 1947).
99
Currie, The Silver Oar and All That, 27 U. CRI1. L. REv. 1, 58 (I959).
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different capacities is permitted, and (3) whether, if the joinder
is permitted, the trial procedure should be the same for all claims.
A. Three-Judge-CourtAnalogies
Certain federal claims are required by Congress to be tried before specially constituted district courts of three judges. 00° Basically they fall into two categories: those involving suits to enjoin
the enforcement of federal or state statutes on the ground of unconstitutionality, and those involving the administration of peculiarly important federal legislation. Ordinarily, review of the judgments of such courts is by direct appeal to the Supreme Court
rather than to the court of appeals for the appropriate circuit. 0 '
The policies behind the requirement of three-judge courts, based
as they are on the desire to eliminate abuses common to decisions
of individual judges 102 and on the importance of the kinds of cases
involved,' are sufficiently strong and clear to prohibit the adjudication of such claims by a single judge, 04 whether joined with
another claim or not.' 5 Thus, if precedent is sought for Romero
in the availability for the combined claims of the court sitting as a
court of general jurisdiction rather than as a specialized court, the
three-judge-court cases would clearly lead to the conclusion that
28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-84 (1958); 32 stat. 823 (1903), as amended, i5
'See
U.S.C. § 28 (1958).
101 There have been exceptions. The three-judge court once authorized by the

Bankruptcy Act was subject to review by the Supreme Court on certiorari. Act of
Oct. 16, 1942, ch. 61o, 56 Stat. 79o, 795. A judgment of a three-judge court authorized to hear condemnation proceedings under the Tennessee Valley Authority Act
is reviewable by appeal to the appropriate court of appeals. 48 Stat. 70 ("933),
I6 U.S.C. § 831x (1958).
102 See Hutcheson, A Case for Three Judges, 47 HARv. L. Rv. 795 (1934);
Frankfurter & Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October Terms,
x935 and 1936, 5I HARv. L. REV. 577, 6io-ig (1938)'; Note, The Judiciary Act of
1937, gi HARe. L. Rv. 148, 151-54 (i937). But see Frankfurter, J., referring to
the three-judge-court requirement "not as a measure of broad social policy to be
construed with great liberality, but as an enactment technical in the strict sense of
the term and to be applied as such." Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 251
(1941).
102 See United States v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 226, 232 (1938); FRANKFURTER &
LANDis, THE BusInmss or"aE SUPREME COURT 263 (1928).
104 See Ex parte Metropolitan Water Co., 220 U.S. 539 (i91i).

See also Ex

parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354 (i94o); Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (I933); EX
parte Hobbs, 280 U.S. v68 (1929); Ex parte Public Nat'l Bank, 278 U.S. 1o1
(1928); Ex parte Collins, 277 U.S. 565 (1928).
105 Cf. New York State Guernsey Breeders Co-op., Inc. v. Wallace, 28 F. Supp.
590 (N.D.N.Y. 1939), aff'd on other grounds sub nona. New York State Guernsey
Breeders Co-op., Inc. v. Wickard, i41 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1944), discussed at p. 844
infra.
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the claims cannot be tried together by the court sitting in its general capacity. Unlike the Jones Act situation, however, the very
nature of the claim cognizable by a three-judge court precludes it,
almost by definition, from being treated as anything but the dominant claim. In the Romero situation, the bases for recovery to be
found in the Jones Act, the claim of unseaworthiness, and the
claim for maritime tort are of equal stature so far as the courts and
the legislature are concerned. It is feasible, therefore, to allow the
plaintiff to characterize that claim as dominant which reasons
peculiar to him make the dominant claim.10 6 This, in effect, is
what the Supreme Court did in Romero when it accepted the plaintiff's labelling of the non-Jones Act claims as "pendent." The
analogy to the three-judge-court cases may be more fruitfully
pursued, therefore, in terms of dominant and subordinate claims
than in terms of the specialized or general capacity of the federal
court.
On this second approach, the question becomes whether the
principal claim before a federal court sitting with capacity to entertain it can carry with it the subordinate claims. The answer is
clear in the first category, the Siler-type case. When the principal
claim involves the question of constitutionality and the secondary
claim has no independent right to be heard in the federal courts,
the Supreme Court has clearly approved the consideration of the
junior claim by the federal three-judge court and has itself entertained such a claim on direct appeal." 7 Thus the Court has not
only sanctioned the joinder of the claims but has provided the
same process for resolution of the secondary as of the primary
claim - trial by a three-judge court and direct appeal to the Supreme Court. When the principal claim presents a constitutional
issue and the subordinate claim has a right of entry to the federal
courts on its own - the third of the four categories suggested at
the outset of this section - the Court has apparently reached the
same conclusion. Thus Mr. Justice Stone, speaking for a unanimous Court in Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Oklahoma Packing
Co., said: "Hence the cause of action alleged against Wilson &
Company, although within the jurisdiction of the district court, is
10 Cf. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.,

241 U.S. 257 (19l6);
The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22 (1913).
107 See Railroad Comm'n v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 302 U.S. 388, 391 (1938);
Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 393-94 (1932); Davis v. Wallace, 257 U.S.
478, 482 (1922); Van Dyke v. Geary, 244 U.S. 39, 42 (1917); Louisville & N.R.R.
v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1913).
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subject to this extraordinary procedure, and appealable directly
to this Court, if at all only because it is incidental to the relief
prayed against the state officers." I's The meaning of "if at all"
has never been specifically clarified by the Court. It might well
refer to the fact that the secondary claim in the case was asserted
against a party different from those defending the principal cause
of action. But the Court has acted as though that phrase added no
qualification when the claims involved the same parties, even in
the absence of identity of issues between the senior and junior
claims. 0 9
Both of these categories of cases provide evidence that the problem is not a jurisdictional one. For when the basis for invoking
the three-judge court has proved groundless, the Supreme Court
has not ordered the dismissal of the claims for want of jurisdiction. It has instead consistently made provision for the case to be
heard in the proper court of appeals. 110 This action can only be
explained on the theory that the defect is "one going to the jurisdiction of the appellate and not of the trial court." I" This is
equally true when the three-judge count is erroneously tried to a
one-judge court. Correction of the error does not require dismissal
for want of jurisdiction, but rather retention of the claim to be
108 292 U.S. 386, 390 (1934).
1 91In United Air Lines v. Public Util. Comm'n, iog F. Supp. 13, IS (N.D.
Cal. 1952), the three-judge court had declined .to decide -the constitutional question., "But there are other adequate bases of federal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
1337, 2201. Such being the case, this Court, having properly acquired jurisdiction,
has power to consider and dispose of all questions involved in the suit." The Supreme Court on direct appeal did not dismiss for want of jurisdiction; it reversed
in a per curiam opinion, presumably because the secondary questions were not ripe
for adjudication under the Declaratory judgment Act. Public Util. Comm'n v.
United Air Lines, 346 U.S. 402 (1953). Again, in Grand Cent. Aircraft Co. v.
Allen, 114 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. Cal. 1953), the three-judge court passed over the
constitutional issues in order to pass on one of statutory construction. The Supreme Court took jurisdiction on a direct appeal and reversed the three-judgecourt judgment on the merits. Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535
(1954). See also Jonco Aircraft Corp. v. Franklin, IT4 F. Supp. 392 (N.D. Tex.),
rev'd per curiam, 346 U.S. 868 (i953).
110 See Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 252 (i94i); Rorick v. Board
of Comm'rs, 307 U.S. 2o8, 213 (1939); William Jameson & Co. v. Morgenthau,
307 U.S. I7M, 174 (1939); International Ladies' Garment Workers v. Donnelly
Garment Co., 304 U.S. 243, 251-52 (1938); Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Oklahoma Packing Co., 292 U.S. 386, 392 (1934); Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas
Co., 292 U.S. i6, i8-g (I934).
I11 ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREsE COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES §

203 n.io (Wolfson & Kurland ed.

195i).
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entertained by a properly constituted tribunal.112 In short, trial
before a district court wearing the wrong hat does not raise jurisdictional questions in the fundamental sense of the term - that is,
with reference to the power of the trial court to entertain the litigation.
When the three-judge court is invoked for reasons other than
the presence of a constitutional issue, the Siler and Oklahoma
support for joinder is gone; present instead is the convenience
doctrine which underlies both the Hurn v. Oursler and Romero
situations. In sole support of the joinder sanctioned by Hum v.
Oursler is the preference for avoidance of two trials of what is in
effect the same lawsuit. With Romero there is no question of infringement on state jurisdiction or of husbanding the resources of
the federal judiciary. But these factors seem to have appeared inadequate to compel the Supreme Court to sanction joinder here
of a three-judge claim with another federal question. Without
distinguishing the cases just discussed, the Court has simply
reached an opposite conclusion, denying joinder.
The negative reply, however, was not the first answer which the
Court gave. In The Chicago Junction Case,"1 3 the Court in an
opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis sustained the joinder of a "suit
to set aside the order" of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
a three-judge-court action, with "a suit to restore the status quo."
Not only was joinder sustained, but the procedure applicable to
the principal claim was also applied to the subordinate one. Moreover, this was done in a case which may well have been of the
Hurn v. Oursler kind rather than the Romero type, i.e., one in
which there was no independent federal jurisdiction over the
second claim." 4
Shortly thereafter, however, Mr. Justice Brandeis seems to have
had second thoughts on the subject. In Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry.
See cases cited note 104 supra.
264 U.S. 258, 269 (1924).
The only independent jurisdictional base would have been diversity of citizenship. One of the plaintiff corporations was incorporated in Illinois, among
other places, and some of the defendants were citizens of Illinois. One of the defendant corporations was incorporated in Illinois, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and
Michigan, among others, all of which were the domiciles of one or more plaintiffs.
The suit was brought in the federal court in Illinois. Transcript of Record, pp. r3, The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1924). It is clear that today the Court
would hold that the requisite diversity of citizenship was not present. Jacobson
v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 347 U.S. 909 (1954), afirming per curiarn 2o6 F.2d
112

2

153 (ist Cir. 1953).
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v. United States," 5 again writing for the Court, he held that the
joinder was improper between the claim giving rise to the threejudge court, which involved an injunction against the effectuation
of the ICC order authorizing the abandonment of a terminal, and
a diversity claim "6' which sought an injunction against the abandonment on grounds of breach of Ohio law of trusts. The Justice
drew a rather tenuous distinction between the two cases:
It is neither ancillary to nor dependent upon the judgment as to the
order. Relief of that character may be had only in a suit invoking
the plenary equity jurisdiction of the district court. Such a suit
would be heard in ordinary course by a single judge; and it would
be appealable only to the Circuit Court of Appeals. The case at bar
is wholly unlike The Chicago Junction Case . . . where a prayer
to set aside the illegal purchase of stock and the lease already made
was held proper as ancillary to setting aside the order of the Com
mission authorizing the same. There, the joinder was permitted in
order to carry out the purpose of Congress to make the judicial
review effective. Here such joinder is unnecessary for that purpose.
Moreover, grounds for general equitable relief, obviously, cannot
give the Pittsburgh a standing in this Court on direct appeal under
the Urgent Deficiencies Act, when it had no right to bring suit under
that Act. 1 7
However sound the distinction, it proved to be the kind of distinction which kills."' Although The Chicago Junction Case has
remained an important one in administrative law, it has never
again been cited in support of the propriety of joinder of claims
in a three-judge-court action. Whenever the question has come
before the Court since the Pittsburghcase, the Court has rejected
the propriety of the joinder. Thus, in New York Cent. Sec. Corp.
v. United States,"' the three-judge court was invoked to hear an
action to enjoin the enforcement of an ICC order approving a
railroad lease. Joined with this claim was one for breach of fiduciary duty in making the lease. The Court held that the issues involved in the second claim "are not properly raised in this suit
under the Urgent Deficiencies Act . . . and hence are not open
115 281 U.S. 479 (1930).
"1'Diversity jurisdiction was clearly present. See Transcript of Record, p. 3,
Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry. v. United States, 281 U.S. 479 (1930).
217 281 U.S. at 488.
118 This is not an extraordinary weapon in the judicial arsenal. See, e.g., the
treatment of Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935), in United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299 (1941), and the ultimate death of the first case in Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649, 661-66 (1944).
119 287 U.S. 12 (1932).
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to review on this appeal." 120 Here, as in Pittsburgh, the Court
might have been saying that the defect was in the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction and not that of the trial court. But this reading would
be inconsistent with the apparent conclusion reached in these cases
and with the language in the later case of Powell v. United
States. 2 ' In the Powell case, an intervenor sought to assert, in a
three-judge-court action, a counterclaim also arising under the
Interstate Commerce Act. The Court very bluntly ordered its
dismissal:
The counterclaim was not properly before the court and could
not be entertained as an incident to or part of the suit to set aside
the commission's order respecting the tariff.
The Seaboard's [plaintiff's] bill merely assails the commission's
order. The issue between the original parties is confined to its
validity. The suit is a statutory one triable only in a specially constituted court. The counterclaim is based on a violation of § i (i8) ;
the facts alleged are not sufficient to constitute a cause of action
within the jurisdiction of that court. .

.

.The counterclaim, not

court,
being within the jurisdiction of the specially constituted
1 22
should have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
This entire line of cases, however, is distinguishable from the
series of three-judge cases heretofore considered and from Romero
in that the parties to the secondary claim necessarily differed from
those involved in the primary claim - since the primary claim
alone involved the ICC. 123

But this distinction requires rejec-

tion of the broad language which the Court has used. On the other
hand, accepting the "jurisdictional" language at its face value certainly brings these cases into conflict with the three-judge-court
constitutional cases. They seem to be reconcilable on only one
proposition: The propriety of the joinder governs the question of
the form of trial to be accorded the secondary claim.
Professor Moore, the most influential writer on the subject of
procedure in the federal courts, ignoring all the Supreme Court
cases except the Pittsburgh case, which he brushes off in a footnote, advises that the joinder of a three-judge-court nonconstitutional claim with a claim independently cognizable by the district
court as ordinarily constituted should be sustained.'2 4 He would
2

" Id. at 28-29.

121 3 0
12 2

U.S.

276 (1937).

Id. at 289-90.
123 See text accompanying note 94 supra.
124 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACrIcE 1 18.0 7 [2] (2d ed. 1948).
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go so far as to allow the three-judge claim to be appended to that
calling for a trial in a district court as regularly constituted. He,
therefore, rejects Judge Patterson's ruling in New York State
Guernsey Breeders Co-op., Inc. v. Wallace.'2 5 The judge may there
have been in error in assuming the impossibility of joinder of
claims, since the three-judge claim was a demand for injunction
based on the unconstitutionality of a federal statute, bringing it
within the Oklahoma category heretofore discussed. But since the
venue was improper for the three-judge claim, and no transfer for
improper venue was then authorized, 2 ' Judge Patterson was
clearly right in dismissing the attempt to append the three-judge
claim to the secondary claim.
Professor Moore's general proposition is supported by Judge
2
Fee's decision in Atlantic Lumber Corp. v. Southern Pac. Co.' 7

There Judge Fee said he would permit the joinder of an action to
enjoin the enforcement of an ICC order denying plaintiff damages
for discriminatory charges with a suit against the railroad for
damages for the same discriminatory charges. The judge ordered
the convening of the three-judge court and ordered the ICC claim
set for hearing before it. He also ruled that if the three-judge
court declined to entertain the subsidiary claim, "hearing will
immediately proceed before a single District Judge. The application of the decision in Pittsburgh & West Virginia Railway Company v. United States . . . may then be considered."

128

Judge

Fee thus separated the propriety of joinder from the question of
the form of trial, just as the majority did in the Romero case. In
so doing, in this context, however, he in effect rejected all the
Supreme Court cases in the Pittsburgh line which assumed implicitly that the propriety of joinder and the form of trial were not
separable questions.
Moore also suggests that, if the defect is really one in the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear on direct appeal the judgment in the secondary claim, then trial by the three-judge court
of both claims could be followed by the entry of separate judgments under Rule 54(b) ,129 with the appeal from one to the Supreme Court and from the other to the appropriate court of ap125 28 F. Supp. 59o (N.D.N.Y. 1939), aft'd on other grounds, 141 F.2d 805
(2d Cir. 1944).
126 See 28 U.S.C. § i4o6(a) (1958), enacted in 1948.
127 2 F.R.D. 313 (D. Ore. 1941).
28

2

129

at 314.
Fmo. R. CIv. P. 54(b).

1d.
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peals. This avenue had not been opened to the Supreme Court at
the time it decided the cases discussed in the text above. The
Romero case might help toward the result of permitting the joinder
in the Pittsburghsituation, either with separate trials as suggested
by Judge Fee, or with separate appeals from the same trial, as suggested by Professor Moore. For in Romero the Court, by sanctioning the joinder but refusing to pass on the method of trial of
the secondary claims, has pointed up the fact that the two questions may properly be separately treated in the nonconstitutional
situation.
B. The Law-Equity Analogy
The second analogy to the Romero problem of the propriety of
entertaining claims which separately would require the district
court to act in different capacities is that of the joinder of claims
in law and equity. In one sense it may be suggested that the
answer to this problem was long ago supplied by the courts at
Westminster: When the principal claim was for equitable remedies, a court of equity had jurisdiction to dispose of the entire
case. But this seems to be applicable to questions of law arising
in an equity action involving but a single claim, or at least to situations in which the ancillary nature of the legal claim is such that
the one cannot well be tried without the other. With regard to
claims of a more separate or separable nature, as in Romero, there
is a different history.
Long ago the Supreme Court recognized that a case brought
before a federal trial court sitting in one capacity when it should
have been sitting in the other did not involve a problem of the
jurisdiction of the trial court. 3 0 Mr. Chief Justice Fuller put it
succinctly in Blythe v. Hinckley: "The Circuit Court held that
the remedy was at law and not in equity. That conclusion was
not a decision that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction as a court
of the United States." "' Mr. Chief Justice Taft gave the rule
broader overtones; a jurisdictional problem is involved, he said,
"only when the District Court's power to hear and determine the
cause as defined and limited by the Constitution or statutes of the
United States is in controversy, and, where a District Court is
vested with jurisdiction of a cause, as where diversity of citizenship exists, and the matter in controversy is of the requisite value,
'30 See, e.g., Smith v. McKay, 161 U.S. 355 (1896).
131 173 U.S. 501, 507 (i899).
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the question whether it has the power to afford the plaintiff a particular remedy does not present a jurisdictional issue." 132
The fact that the problem was not a jurisdictional one, however,
did not answer the question of how to treat a claim brought on the
wrong "side" of the court or what to do about the joinder of several
claims properly cognizable on different "sides" of the court. At
the very same time that the Court was acknowledging the absence
of a jurisdictional question, it was sanctioning the dismissal of
33
actions brought before the court sitting in the wrong capacity.
Thus, Mr. Justice Shiras, who wrote the opinion in Smith v.
McKay 134 rejecting the notion of a jurisdictional defect, expressed the view of the Court in Lindsay v. First Nat'l Bank:
The case is thus brought within the rule, which this court has so
often had occasion to lay down, that the remedies in the courts of
the United States are, at common law or in equity, not according to
the practice of state courts, but according to the principles of
common law and equity, as distinguished and defined in that country from which we derive our knowledge of these principles, and
that although the forms of proceedings and practice in the state
courts shall have been adopted in the Circuit Courts of the United
States, yet the adoption of the state practice must not be understood as confounding the principles of law and equity, nor as authorizing legal and equitable claims to be blended together in one
suit. Bennett v. Butterworth, ii How. 669, 674; Thompson v.
Railroad Companies, 6 Wall. 134; Broderick will case, 21 Wall.
503, 520.

It is true that the cases in which such strictures have been expressed have been usually those in which resort has been had to
equitable forms of relief instead of legal remedies, and when defendants have thus been deprived of the constitutional right of trial
by jury; but, so long as we attach importance to regular forms of
procedure, we cannot sustain so plain an attempt as is here presented to substitute the machinery of a court of law, in which the
1 32

Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R.,

1 3

See Curriden v. Middleton,

232

274

U.S.

ISI,

185

(1927).

U.S. 633 (1914); Northern Pac. R.R. v.

Paine, rig U.S. 56i (,887); Foster v. Mora, 98 U.S. 425 (1878). The Court did
treat the defect as waivable, in accordance with its nonjurisdictional nature. See
Reynes v. Dumont, 130 U.S. 354 (1889); Kilbourn v. Sunderland, 130 U.S. 5o5
(z889); Wylie v. Coxe, 56 U.S. (I5 How.) 415 (1853). But also, somewhat inconsistently, it indicated that the court could raise the issue on its own motion.
Lewis v. Cocks, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 466 (1874); Hipp v. Babin, 6o U.S. (ig How.)
271 (x8s6).
134 161 U.S. 355 (1896).

HeinOnline -- 73 Harv. L. Rev. 846 1959-1960

I96O]

ROMERO AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION

facts are found by the jury and the law prescribed by the judge for
the usual and legitimate practice of a court of chancery ...
It is, therefore, clear that the court below should have sustained
the defendants' demurrer or exception, and dismissed the suit.135
This problem was partially solved in 1912 by the promulgation of
Equity Rule 22 by the Supreme Court. This rule provided: "If
at any time it appear that a suit commenced in equity should have
been brought as an action on the law side of the court, it shall be
forthwith transferred to the law side and be there proceeded with,
with only such alteration in the pleadings as shall be essential." "I
This was followed by the I9M5 amendment to the Judicial Code
which authorized the transfer from either side of the trial court to
the other.' 37 (In the Romero Term, the Supreme Court adopted
the same principle in the admiralty area by ordering the transfer
of a maritime cause erroneously brought on the law side of the
court.' 38 ) But neither the equity rule nor the statute solved the
joinder problem.1 39 That remained until the promulgation of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. Rule i8(a) now provides: "The plaintiff in his complaint or in a reply setting forth a
counterclaim and the defendant in an answer setting forth a
counterclaim may join either as independent or as alternate claims
as many claims either legal or equitable or both as he may have
against the opposing party." The rule has been appropriately described as the culmination of "the trend of more recent American
reform measures . . . [toward] a completely free joinder of
causes of action with identity of parties, provision being made for
the severance or separate trial if the interests of justice require." 140
It should be noted that the solution of the joinder problem still
left unanswered the question of the appropriate form of trial when
joinder is permitted. It has certainly not followed here, as has
been assumed by many courts in the admiralty and three-judgecourt cases, that the authorization of joinder is the equivalent of
sanctioning a single form of trial for all the claims.
There are some situations, derived from the old equity proce235 i56 U.S. 485, 493-94 (1895).
136 226 U.S. 654 (1912).
137 Act of March 3, igi, ch. 90, 38 Stat. 956; see Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon

Nat'l Bank, 260 U.S. 235 (X922).
38
1 Aho v. Jacobsen, 359 U.S. 25 (I959).

139
See Equity R. 26, 226 U.S. 655-56 (1912).
4 0
2
MILTAR, Civir. PROcEDURE OF THE TRiAL COURT 3N HISTORICAL

114 (1952).
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dure, in which all the claims will be tried according to the nature
of the principal claim.' 4 ' But the pattern in the law-equity conglomeration generally has been for the judge to try the equity
causes and the jury the legal ones.' 42 For the most part, however,
the controversy has not been about the divided form of trial but
rather about which issues should be tried first, in light of the fact
that the first adjudication will be res judicata.143 The demand of
the Supreme Court that the jury questions be tried first was
clearly established during the Romero Term, albeit by a sharply
divided court, in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover.'44 There the
plaintiff had sought a declaratory judgment that it was not violating the antitrust laws and an injunction against suits based on
those laws. The defendant entered a compulsory counterclaim 145
under the antitrust laws seeking treble damages and asked for a
jury. The trial court, "under the purported authority of Rules
42(b) and 57," 146 ordered the issues raised by the complaint to
be tried to the bench first, leaving the counterclaim for subsequent
jury trial. Since most, if not all, of the issues raised by the declaratory-judgment-injunction action would dispose of the issues raised
by the counterclaim, in effect this meant that the case would be
tried to the bench, as the courts recognized. 47 Mr. Justice Black,
writing for a five-man majority, held that that the demand for
declaratory relief did not make the issues equitable for purposes of
jury trial. Nor did the demand for injunctive relief require that
the plaintiff's claim be tried first. He said that the court of appeals' reliance 14s on American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart 149 was mis-

placed, since that case was "decided before the enactment of the
141 See,

e.g., Camp v. Boyd, 229 U.S. 530, 552

(1913); Chappell & Co. v.

Palermo Cafe, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 867 (D. Mass. 1956), appeal dismissed, 249 F.2d
77 (ist Cir. i957). These cases seem to have been severely restricted by the
rationale underlying the Beacon Theatres case, discussed below.
142 See, e.g., Chappell & Co. v. Palermo Cafe Co., 249 F.2d 77, 81 (ist Cir.
1957) (dictum); Leimer v. Woods, 196 F.2d 828, 832 (8th Cir. 1952); Tanimura
v. United States, i95 F.2d 329 (gth Cir. 1952)*; Orenstein v. United States, 191
F.2d 184 (ist Cir. 9gsi).
14 Compare Leiner v. Woods, 196 F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1952), and Bruckman
v. Hollzer, 152 F.2d 730 (gth Cir. 1946), with Orenstein v. United States, i91 F.2d
184 (ist Cir. 1951), and Tanimura v. United States, 195 F.2d 329 ( 9 th Cir. 1952).
144 359 U.S. 500 (I959).
141 See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
146 359 U.S. at 503.
1 47
Id. at 503-04.
148 252 F.2d 864, 873 (gth Cir. -958).
149 300 U.S. 203 (1937).
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ROMERO AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" 110 which, by authorizing the
joinder of the equitable and legal claims generally provided an adequate legal remedy making the resort to equity unnecessary.
If there should be cases where the availability of declaratory
judgment or joinder in one suit of legal and equitable causes would
not in all respects protect the plaintiff seeking equitable relief from
irreparable harm while affording a jury trial in the legal cause, the
trial court will necessarily have to use its discretion in deciding
whether the legal or equitable cause should be tried first. Since the
right to jury trial is a constitutional one, however, while no similar
requirement protects trials by the court,151 that discretion is very
narrowly limited and must, wherever possible, be exercised to preserve jury trial. .

.

. [O]nly under the most imperative circum-

stances, circumstances which in view of the flexible procedures of
the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right to a jury
trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable
52

claims.1

Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for Justices Harlan and Whittaker
as well,' 53 dissented, asserting that although it was "of no great
moment in what order the issues between the parties in the present
litigation are tried," the Court had arrived at its decision by a
"disregard [of] the historic relationship between equity and
law." 15 For the minority the Federal Rules made no change in
the principles enunciated by Mr. Justice Cardozo in the American Life Insurance case: "[T]hey expressly affirm the power of a
trial judge to determine the order in which claims shall be
heard." 155
The implications of the law-equity cases for the Romero problem are obvious. The courts have here utilized the approach suggested by Professor Moore and Judge Fee with regard to the threejudge-court cases: permitting joinder but requiring different forms
of trial for the separate claims. This is a possible but not the most
desirable solution of the Romero problem.
It would seem from these two analogues, that the Court in
150 359 U.S. at 505.
151 It is not irrelevant to the consideration of the Romero doctrine to note
that one of the cases cited by the Court at this point was The Propeller Genesee
Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (i2 How.) 443, 459-60 (I851).

U.S. at 5io-iI.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter did not participate.

152 359

153

154 359
155

U.S. Rt 514.

Id. at

519.
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Romero reached the right conclusions but used the wrong concepts
in doing so. For if the analogues are relevant, the questions presented by Romero clearly were not jurisdictional ones, nor even
ones of pendent jurisdiction. Instead the issues were the propriety
of joinder of the claims and the appropriate method of trial for the
different claims. While there is some evidence that the Court has
treated these as inseparable, the law-equity cases show that they
are indeed distinct issues. And the majority in Romero so treated
them by answering the joinder question without passing on the
proper method of trying the non-Jones Act issues. Nonetheless,
since the mode of trial should be resolved in the way "most conducive to the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the business of the courts," 156 no jurisdictional problem being present,
when the question is ultimately resolved it should be in favor of
a single jury trial for all the claims, for the reasons given by Professor Currie 117 and because the alternative presents the unreasonable and unnecessary difficulties catalogued by Judge Wyzanski in McDonald v. Cape Cod Trawling Corp.5 8
Romero is a many-faceted case; only a few of those facets have
been examined here. It is a case which is likely to call forth a
great deal of comment, most of which is likely to be as inconsistent
as were the differing opinions expressed by the Justices themselves.
Like all landmark decisions, 59 its meaning will only unfold in the
course of judicial application and may, like Erie, require decades
of refinement. The dragon's teeth have been sown; it remains to
see what the harvest will bring.
56 Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437, 446 (2d Cir. 1959).

15 Currie, The Silver Oar and All That, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. I (i959); see
Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 265 F.2d 426, 429 (ist Cir. 1959).
158 71 F. Supp. 888 (D. Mass. 1947).
159 See generally LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REASONING
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